Civil War Book Review
Summer 2014

Article 4

When the Wolf Came: the Civil War and the Indian Territory
Daniel Herman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr

Recommended Citation
Herman, Daniel (2014) "When the Wolf Came: the Civil War and the Indian Territory," Civil War Book
Review: Vol. 16 : Iss. 3 .
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.16.3.06
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol16/iss3/4

Herman: When the Wolf Came: the Civil War and the Indian Territory

Review
Herman, Daniel
Summer 2014

Warde, Mary Jane When the Wolf Came: The Civil War and the Indian
Territory. University of Arkansas Press, $34.95 ISBN 978-1-55728-642-0
A Look at the Civil War in Indian Territory
When I teach the Civil War, I talk very little about its impact on American
Indians. I note that the tribes had divided loyalties; that the Cherokees reluctantly
sided with the Confederacy, then with the Union, but were forced to cede much
of their land anyway once the war was over; and that the U.S. carried out the
largest mass execution in U.S. history when it hanged 38 Sioux at Mankato,
Minnesota, after an “uprising" (really a war) in 1862.
After reading Warde’s book, I realize how little I knew. Here is the rich,
full, and terrible story of the war’s impact not just on Indians who resided in
Indian Territory (modern Oklahoma), but also those who resided throughout the
American West. We learn of the heroic and tragic attempt by a Creek leader
named Opothle Yahola to lead neutrals and Unionists—along with runaway
slaves—to safety in Kansas at the outset of the war. Confederate forces—Texan
units allied with American Indians from Indian Territory—attacked the party
twice, finally scattering it to the winds. Many perished; some, including Yahola,
straggled into Kansas utterly destitute and half-frozen, where even more
suffering awaited. Preoccupied with the war effort in the East and often
indifferent to Indians, the Union government failed to provide adequate supplies,
leaving refugees to suffer through winter in the most miserable conditions
imaginable, often without shelter, blankets, food, or medicine.
The fate of Opothle Yahola and his followers was just the opening round of
the hell brought by the war. Not a single tribe in the Midwest (or for that matter
the West more broadly) escaped the fallout. Slaveholding Indians tended to side
with the Confederacy, not surprisingly, though at least some—particularly John
Ross, leader of the Cherokee—tried to keep their people neutral. In the end,
neither Ross nor others could stay out of the contest. Both Confederates and
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Unionists vied for their loyalties and attacked those they deemed “traitors,"
including, at times, neutrals. Indians themselves, meanwhile, often had strong
loyalties one way or the other, or at least had strategic reasons to make alliances.
(I was particularly struck by the tenacity of pro-Union Indians, many of whom
espoused abolition. They stuck with the Union throughout the war even though
the Union gave them little reason to do so.)
The tragedy of the war wasn’t solely that Indians fought what was
essentially their own civil war in Indian Territory, with Cherokee facing off
against Cherokee, Creek against Creek, Chickasaw against Chickasaw, but also
that the Union government could have headed off the storm. At the war’s outset,
the Union refused to provide treaty annuities that the tribes desperately needed.
Union leaders argued that the annuities would simply fall into the hands of
Confederates. The result was the opposite of what was intended: Confederate
sympathizers argued that the Union could not be trusted, thus converting
thousands to the cause of secession.
What followed was mayhem. The balance of power see-sawed back and
forth for the duration of the war (despite substantial Union gains in 1862-63).
Thinking it had the upper hand midway through the war, the Union sent Indian
refugees back to their homes prematurely, causing untold suffering when they
were attacked and plundered. Plundering, indeed, became ubiquitous, with
Jayhawkers and bushwhackers roaming Indian Territory unchecked (among
them was William Quantrill, who sometimes campaigned with Stand Watie and
other Confederates, but who was essentially a sadistic murderer). Even the
pro-Union Cherokee “pins"—a society mostly comprised of full-bloods who
opposed slavery—often turned into mere bandits. Death was everywhere; refuge
impossible. At times, pitched battles turned into mass executions as the winning
side chased down stragglers and killed them without mercy. This was
particularly true when the winners were Confederates and the losers were black
troops from Kansas, many of them runaways from Indian Territory.
The final chapter in this terrible saga was the Union’s merciless decision to
seize tribal lands. The pretext, of course, was that some of the tribes had sided
with the Confederacy, thus abrogating their treaties. In new treaties—or, later, in
mere Executive Orders—the Union took away millions of acres, opening it to
homesteaders and railroad interests or, alternately, reserving some of it for tribes
undergoing removal from other parts of the West. Indians from Kansas and
Nebraska—most of them neutral or even pro-Union during the war—repeatedly
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lost their reservations and were compelled to accept smaller parcels in Indian
Territory. In a final insult to tribal sovereignty, the U.S. compelled the tribes in
what became “Oklahoma" to accept both allotment in severalty and U.S.
Territorial status (thus creating a territorial government, and later a state
government, that trumped tribal governments). The war, in short, gave the
Union—and the corporate forces that often drove its decisions—the chance to
pursue removal policies with an even greater zeal than Andrew Jackson’s.
Warde’s book will stand for decades as the most comprehensive and
thoughtful study of the Civil War’s impact on Indian Territory. To her credit, she
doesn’t stick solely to the narrative of the war, but shows how the war helped
give rise to massive relocations (ethnic cleansings) over the next several decades.
At times, the books seems a bit too encyclopedic, but Warde makes a good case
that even seemingly unrelated events—e.g., the Modoc War and the removal that
followed—were precipitated by events in the 1860s.
Nevertheless there is one thread that is absent. One longs for some
commentary on Eli Parker, General Grant’s aide-de-camp who then became the
first Indian Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Where was Parker’s voice amid the
dislocations that followed the war? Why, moreover, did his opponents force him
to resign (was it because he took shortcuts to help Indian peoples get needed
supplies? Was it because he opposed the rapacity of white settlers and railroads?
Was it simply due to a Democratic vendetta against Grant? Surely Parker’s story
should be part of the whole). One other small gripe: there should be numerous
maps to help the reader situate the events, not just a single tiny map at the
beginning. All in all, however, this is very fine scholarship indeed, carefully
crafted, abundantly researched, and told with an eye to both detail and clarity.
Having read this book, I will never think of the Civil War in quite the same way.
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